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DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT AS A REMEDY FOR
DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL*
THE Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees to the accused
in all criminal proceedings the right to a speedy trial.1 Most state constitutions.
contain an identical provision.2 This safeguard comes into effect after a com-
plaint is filed against the accused ;3 it is designed to protect him from undue
burdens in the nature of penal sanctions before trial 4 and from being handi-
capped in his defense during trial.0 The usual procedure for enforcement is
a motion by the accused for an early trial, made in the court where the prose-
cution is pending, G followed by a petition to the appellate court for a writ of
mandamus if the motion is denied.7 If the defendant fails to take these steps,
he may be held to have waived his constitutional right.8 However, in some
*United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955), appeal docketed, No. 195,
U.S. Sup. Ct., June 30, 1955.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2. See, e.g., CAL, CoNsT. art. I, § 13; MICH. CoNsT. art. II, § 10; PA. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 9. New York has an identical statutory provision. N.Y. CoDE CRim. PRAc. § 8. Nevada
has no constitutional provision but, like many states, sets a statutory limit on the time
for bringing trial. NEv. ComP. LAWS § 11194-99 (1929) (term following indictment).
See also, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382 (Supp. 1953) (sixty days); VA. CODE § 19-165
(1950) (three terms). The sixth amendment does not apply directly to the states. Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). However, the Supreme Court has not decided whether
the right to speedy trial is made applicable by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
3. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
935 (1952).
Courts have interpreted the rule liberally by relating subsequent proceedings back to
the original indictment; intervening delay is then relevant. Nolan v. United States, 163
F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955); Nixon
v. State, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 497 (1844). Moreover, after determining that speedy trial
had been lost, one court considered prejudice caused by pre-indictment circumstances.
United States v. Provoo, supra. For a proposal that the right to speedy trial should
protect those under threat of indictment see Note, 5 STAN. L. Rzv. 95 (1952).
4. Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Ex parte Pickerill, 44 F. Supp.
741 (N.D. Texas 1942); United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880). See text at notes
22-25 infra.
5. United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947); cases cited note 4
supra. See text at notes 35-38 infra.
6. Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1946); Pietch v. United States,
110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940) ; Daniels v. United States,
17 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 274 U.S. 744 (1927).
7. Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925); United States v. Cox, 47 F.2d
989 (5th Cir. 1931); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 168 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1948); Danziger v.
United States, 161 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 744 (1929).
Failure to demand trial may be held to constitute a waiver despite a motion to dismiss
for lack of speedy trial. Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
situations mandamus is not effective to enforce the right to speedy trial.0
And a recent case has held that where the usual procedure is inadequate,
dismissal of the indictment is proper.10 The case raises important questions
of the significance of the cause of delay in the loss of a speedy trial, and of
the factors which should lead to a decision to dismiss.
In United States v. Provoo 11 the government sought to prosecute Provoo
for the second time on a charge of treason. He had been indicted for the
offense five years earlier, and convicted in a New York district court, but the
decision had been vacated on the ground of improper venue. 12 After re-
indictment in Maryland the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland held that a new trial would not be speedy within the meaning of
the sixth amendment, and that dismissal of the indictment was appropriate
310 U.S. 648 (1940); cf. Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1947) (sendle)
(waiver despite petition for habeas corpus).
The waiver doctrine might be held inapplicable when the accused is without counsel.
Accord, United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) (wvaiver of jury
trial without counsel must be with full knowledge) ; cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 45S
(1938) (no waiver of right to counsel without intelligent and competent act). But see
Bayless v. United States, 147 F2d 169, rcv'd on other grounds, 150 F.2d 236 (Sth Cir.
1945) (second prosecution no denial of speedy trial where, after five years, habeas corpus
voided conviction based on guilty plea made without counsel).
9. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. 'Md. 1955).
Mandamus may frequently be ineffective when time before trial is consumed by pro-
ceedings which are prompt but erroneous. The first valid trial may not occur until an
indictment has been quashed, a mistrial declared, or a conviction reversed or voided by
collateral attack. In any of these cases delay may be traceable to an erroneous ruling
by the trial court. For mandamus to be effective in this situation it would b2 necessary
to subject each ruling which could lead to delay to immediate review by mandamus
proceedings. In some instances the prejudicial act may be completed so quickly that no
prohibition is possible. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 200 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.
1952) (co-defendant striking United States marshall in presence of jury).
A writ of mandamus will issue only where it appears that a court has abused its
discretion. Since this is difficult to prove, mandamus may be unavailable to end
many delays which seem to deny speedy trial. Compare Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d
796 (8th Cir. 1925), with United States v. Cox, 47 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1931).
Some state statutes which require that the prosecution be dismissed if trial is not
commenced promptly may also be ineffective since a new indictment may not b2 barred.
E.g., N.D. Ray. CoDE §§ 29-1801-02 (1943); WAsH. REX. ConE §§ 10.43.010, 10.46.010
(1951) ; accord, In re Deslovers, 40 RI.L 89, 100 At1. 64 (1917) ; cf. United States v.
Cadarr, 197 U.S. 475 (1905).
10. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955).
11. 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955).
12. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954). Provoo was discharged
from the Army at Fort Jay, New York He was immediately arrested and indicted in
the Southern District of New York. Jurisdiction was based on 18 U.S.C. § 3233 (1952),
which provides for trial of offenses committed outside the United States in the district
where the offender is "found." The Second Circuit held that Provoo %was not "found"
in New York but had been deliberately transferred there at the request of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. An alternate ground for
reversal was erroneous admission of evidence. United States v. Provoo, supra.
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relief. The court regarded mandamus at a prior stage as ineffective, since it
would have led to trial in an improper district. The decision to dismiss was
based on findings that the government chose to bring the case in New York
where it must have known that venue was doubtful, and that the prosecution
withheld facts bearing on the venue issue from the New York court when it
heard that question. 13 Having found that the prosecution deliberately caused
the delay, the court reasoned that prejudice to the accused must be presumed
to follow, and in the alternative it found prejudice as a fact. The court con-
cluded that under that condition a trial would be unfair.
The approach of analyzing the cause of delay is often used by courts as a
preliminary step to a determination that dismissal is inappropriate ;14 however,
the extent to which cause should influence dismissal must be carefully ex-
amined. A cause analysis may show that the accused is not entitled to any
relief. Where he was at fault in creating or not terminating the obstacle
to trial, he may be estopped or held to have waived his right.16 And delays
13. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 201-02 (D. Md. 1955).
Before trial in New York, defense counsel moved for additional particulars including
all relevant Army administrative records. But it was not until after conviction that the
government produced the records from which the Second Circuit found that Provoo had
been moved to New York for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. See note 12 supra.
Provoo was charged with treasonable conduct during 1942-45 while lie was a prisoner
of Japan. He was under military arrest in Japan from August 1945 to April 1946. After
release he was restored to full duty, but in the summer of 1949 he was rearrested at Fort
Meade, Maryland, technically for unrelated charges. When the U.S. Department of Justice
was ready to proceed against Provoo, the Army transferred him to New York where lie
was discharged. Indictment was prompt, but trial was postponed for nearly three years.
There were a number of causes for delay, and some of them operated concurrently. In
addition to time consumed in preparing for trial the major obstacles were obtaining
court-appointed defense counsel (six months), securing court approval for depositions (five
months), making funds available for depositions (four months), and replacing government
counsel (nearly one year). Trial began in October 1952, and the appellate decision was
announced in August 1954. The second indictment was returned in Maryland in October
1954.
The Maryland court found that the significant delay was not the time required to
bring the New York case to trial, but was the time lost subsequently because the case
was in the wrong district. Id. at 201.
14. See, e.g., Gerardino v. Porto Rico, 29 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1928); McDonald v.
Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940); United States
v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (dissent).
15. Creating delay: Morland v. United States, 193 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1951) (avoid-
ing apprehension and being incarcerated in state prison); Gerardino v. Porto Rico, 29
F.2d 517 (lst Cir. 1928) (requesting continuance); State v. Salmeier, 148 Wash. 627,
269 Pac. 798 (1928) (marrying prosecutrix).
Failing to terminate delay: Danziger v. United States, 161 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1947) ;
Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940);
Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 744 (1927). In
many states a statutory right to dismissal may be similarly waived. See, e.g., McCandless
v. District Court, 61 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1953). Counsel's independent assent to delay
may bind the accused. State v. Turlok, 76 Mont. 549, 248 Pac. 169 (1926).
The question of waiver may arise when the defendant initiates a time-consuming action
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which are an inherent part of our judicial system cannot be said to deprive
the accused of a speedy trial.' 6 But delays which are wilfully caused and those
due to errors, either negligent or bona fide, are not essential to the administra-
tion of justice. And courts recognize that wilfully caused delays may lead to
dismissal.1 7 However, to exclude delays caused by bona fide or negligent
errors from the sixth amendment by holding them to be a proper burden for
the accused would be inconsistent with the policy of speedy trial-to protect
the accused from harm. Delays traceable to error are not infrequent,'6 and
as the Provoo court recognized, the degree of prejudice or detriment suffered
by the accused is unrelated to any particular reason for delay.' On tile other
hand, to dismiss an indictment whenever there is error-induced delay would
seriously disrupt society's policy of bringing offenders to trial.20 The two
interests can be accommodated, however, by confining dismissal to cases where
the accused has been injured.-'
to correct an error made by the court or the prosecution. When the action taken is
reasonably designed to protect a constitutional right, to hold that the defendant thereby
waives his right to a speedy trial would have the harsh result of forcing him to elect
between rights. United States v. 'cWilliams, 163 F2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Contra,
Nixon v. State, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 497 (1844).
16. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905); Kong v. United States, 216 F.2d 605
(9th Cir. 1954); Germany v. Hudspeth, 209 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1954). When delays
which are a part of the federal judicial system become unreasonable the system can be
modified by the Supreme Court under its power to supervise the federal courts. McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For
a discussion of other remedies, see E.r parte The State, in re Tate, 76 Ala. 482, 484 (1884).
17. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S.
744 (1927); Nixon v. State, 10 Miss. (2 S. & M.) 497 (1844); Butts v. Commonwealth,
145 Va. 800, 133 S.E. 764 (1926).
18. In addition to the reported cases of errors reversed on appeal, over 2% of all
trials in 13 federal districts during 1927-30 ended in mistrial. 1 ALI, A STUDY oF THE
BusimEss OF THE: FEDERAL CoURTS 11, 133 (1934). Other errors which are discovered
and corrected without mistrial or reversal- are, of course, also time-consuming.
19. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,202 (D. Md. 1955). An additional objection
to distinguishing among wilfullness, negligence and bona fides is that relief would then
be dependent upon difficult questions of proof. If the line is drawn between wilfuline!s
and negligence the intent of the court or prosecutor would be in issue. If the line is
drawn between negligent and bona fide errors the difficulties inherent in a malpractice
case would confront the accused.
20. State v. Be ckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944) ; McCandless v. District
Court, 61 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1953). The desire to bring an accused person to trial
may be strongly correlated to the desire to convict the guilty since 75 to 80% of criminal
trials end in conviction. See 1 AUI, op. cit. supra note 18, at 115; U.S. DEsTr or Comm.rx,
JuDicAL% CRMNAL STAnisTics 2 (1945). ,Vhere as in Provoo, the accusation is of a
serious nature the appropriateness of dismissal as a remedy for denial of speedy trial
is diminished. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE Clus. PRAc. § 673; UTAH CODE Am-. § 77-51-6
(1953) ; GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-1901-012 (1953).
21. A policy of protecting future accused persons might warrant dismissal whenever
the government causes delay on the theory that the government will thereby be spurred
to more scrupulous observance of its duty to bring an accused to trial speedily. However,
19551
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
One of the consequences of loss of a speedy trial is that the accused may
suffer certain pre-conviction burdens in the nature of penal sanctions, but
they do not often warrant dismissal. These detriments are (1) the stigma
attached to the accused and his family during long pendency of charges,-2
and consequent economic loss ;23 (2) imprisonment or release on bail with
its limitations on freedom of movement and its cost;24I and (3) the pyscho-
logical strain of an uncertain future.2 5 But several of these detriments can be
terminated without the drastic remedy of dismissal. If the accused were
brought to trial and acquitted, 2 the public vindication of his innocence should
remove or substantially reduce any stigma which may have attached to him.
And until the conclusion of trial he could be released from imprisonment or
discharged from bail.2 7 It is true that in some cases a long period of uncer-
tainty before trial might make the accused pyschologically vulnerable to the
tensions which trial may generate, 2 and in these instances, as the Provoo
case suggests, dismissal may be appropriate. 29 In the usual case, however, this
psychological element may well be absent, and courts should require proof
the primary remedy of mandamus already implements this policy. The speed with which
most cases are tried, 1 ALI, op. cit. supra note 18, at 135 (federal district courts in 1927-
30 concluded 70% of all cases within 6 months of indictment), and the possibility of
devising alternative incentives, see, e.g., 64 STAT. 137 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 692 (1952)
(prosecution of anyone subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice who delays
disposition of cases thereunder), suggest that the need for dismissal as an additional iuple-
menting device is not now sufficient to overcome the desire to test the innocence of
the present accused, see note 20 supra.
22. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) ; United States v. Florin, 13 F.R.D.
296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); State e.r rel. Micheel v. Vamos, 144 Ohio St. 628, 60 N.E.2d 305
(1945).
23. Hicks v. Recorder's Court, 236 Mich. 689, 211 N.W. 35 (1926).
24. Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925) (imprisonment); United
States v. Foster, 79 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (bail); see, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. §§
62-1431-33 (1949) (prosecution dismissed if accused not brought to trial in two terms if
imprisoned, three terms if on bail).
25. United States ex rel. Whitaker v. Henning, 15 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Frankel
v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925).
26. If the prosecution is not ready to proceed to trial, the accused has the right to
dismissal for want of prosecution. FED. R. Calm. P. 48(b).
27. United States v. Thorne, 15 Fed. 739 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
Federal courts have discretionary power to release an accused on bail, even though
charged with a capital offense. FED. R. Cimm. P. 46(a) (1). Although there is no specific
grant of power to discharge bail, an equivalent power, to set aside forfeiture of bail for
breach of conditions, exists under FED. R. Cuml. P. 46(f).
Some states without statutes prescribing dismissal require release from imprisonment
or discharge from bail if trial is not had within a stated period. See, e.g., DEL. Coou
ANN. tit. 10, § 6910 (1953); Wis. STAT. § 355.10 (1953). This may result in the
prisoner's escape, State v. Walker, 100 A2d 413 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953), but this risk
seems preferable to the certainty of freedom through dismissal.
28. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); GUTrMACHER & WEIIIOFEN, PsY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 436-38 (1952).
29. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md. 1955).
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that standing trial will be an extraordinary hardship.30 Even if dismissal is
unnecessary to prevent future detriments, it might be considered appropriate
as compensation to the accused for harmful effects already suffered. But the
inevitability of some detriments accruing before any trial,3 ' the impossibility
of making the benefit of dismissal proportionate to the harm suffered, 2 and
the need for society to try offenders 33 seem to outweigh the argument for
dismissal as a remedy.34
An additional result of delay in reaching trial is possible prejudice to tile
ability of the accused to defend himself, and this may warrant dismissal.
Thus the Provoo court in its alternative analysis found that Provoo's mental
condition had so deteriorated that he would be unable to cooperate in his
defense and that several prospective witnesses had died before trial.5 Other
circumstances might also make witnesses unavailable,30 or time might cause
their memories to fade.37 Moreover, the long pendency of charges might
make it impossible to finance a defense.38 In any of these situations the burden
of proving guilt could be materially lightened, and the task of defending
considerably increased. A conviction under these circumstances would, as the
Provoo court held, violate the standards of fairness prescribed by due process
and implied by the guarantee of a speedy trial.3 9 Therefore, except where a
30. Cf. United States v. Foster, 81 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N..Y. 1948); Greene v. Com-
monwealth, 282 Ky. 364, 138 S.,V2d 996 (1940); Murphy v. State, 72 Okla. Crnim. 1,
112 P2d 438 (1941).
31. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). It was probably recognition of
inevitable detriment which causcd the Anglo-American judicial system to emphasize the
safeguards of the indictment process rather than a right to reimbursement for time and
money consumed by trial. See id. at 522 (majority), 555 (dissent).
32. The benefit of dismissal may even vary inversely with the amount of harm
suffered. Stigma and resulting economic loss may be a greater detriment to the inmccent
citizen of good reputation than to the guilty habitual criminal. But the benefit of dismissal
will be greater to the guilty than to the innocent.
33. See note 20 supra.
34. If it is desirable to indemnify the accused for detriments he has suffered, alter-
nate means of compensation could be devised. See Mass. ANN. LAws c. 277, § 73 (1932)
(cash payments after acquittal to defendant denied speedy trial); United States v. Rum-
rich, 180 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1950) (sentence might be reduced).
35. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 195 (D. Md. 1955). See note 30 mipra.
36. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 253 U.S. 254 (1922) (disappearance); United States v.
'McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (moving to unknown locations). Similarly,
witnesses may leave the jurisdiction of the court, or they may become incompetent.
Furthermore, the problem extends to non-testimonial proof. United States v. McWilliams,
supra (records lost).
37. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); United States v. McWilliams, 163 F2d
695 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Wynnewood Civic Ass'n v. Lower Merion Tp., 175 Pa. Super. 20,
102 A.2d 423 (1954).
38. United States v. McWilliams, 163 F2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See text at notes
22-24 supra.
39. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,203 (D. Md. 1955); United States v. Haupt,
136 F2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943). Moreover, requiring trial where the accused is unable
1213
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cause analysis has shown relief to be inappropriate, if the accused has been
prejudiced dismissal would be justified to protect his right.
However, it does not seem proper to presume, as the court did in its
principal holding in Provoo, that delay invariably leads to prejudice. Although
prejudice may arise from delay, it does not follow that prejudice either
necessarily, or more probably than not, results from delay.40 Nor do difficulties
of proof warrant the presumption. Before trial a psychiatric examination can
disclose whether the mental condition of the accused has so deteriorated that
he is unable to cooperate in his defense.41 And if the defendant believes him-
self aggrieved by the death or absence of a witness or by his faded memory,
the witness should be identified and prejudice established.42 Moreover, when
a motion to dismiss has been made courts have the discretion to proceed with
trial and postpone a decision until the case is concluded.43 Often it would be
desirable to exercise this discretion and determine the prejudice question dur-
ing trial. For with all the evidence before it the court would be better able to
decide whether testimony of the absent or forgetful witness was material to
the defense of the accused.44
to cooperate in his own defense might deprive him of his right to counsel. Ashley v.
Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945).
40. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922) ; United States v. Holmes, 168 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1948) ; State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944). In fact, delay
may be of great benefit to the accused. "Delay . . . greatly aids the guilty to escape
because witnesses disappear, their memory becomes less accurate and time lessens the
vigor of officials charged with the duty of prosecution." Taft, C.J. in Ponzi v. Fesseuden,
supra, at 264; cf. Williams, Speed Up the Trial, 9 TEXAs B.J, 389 (1946).
Since the risk of non-persuasion is on the prosecution, it would seem that in a trial of
doubtful outcome loss of testimony is more likely to benefit than to prejudice the defend-
ant. Although it is not clear that the federal rational connection test, Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), applies to presumptions in favor of an accused, it might
conceivably be argued that the test is required to protect the public's right of prosecution,
see Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905) ; Western & Ati. R.R. v. Henderson, 279
U.S. 639 (1929).
41. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) ; United States v. Chandler,
72 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 19,18), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 918 (1949).
42. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944); accord, King v. Haas,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 9 (Pa. 1764) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (1930) (during continuance
to obtain prosecution witnesses, accused must be released on bail unless witnesses are named).
43. FE. R. CRim. P. 12(b) (4); see ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PRocunuRa § 215 (1930)
and statutes cited in commentary.
44. Even during trial it may be difficult to predict the effect on the defendant's case
of the absence of specific evidence. See, e.g., Hair v. United States, 240 Fed. 333 (7th
Cir. 1917). The problem is manifestly greater if prediction must be done before trial.
Moreover, to conduct a trial instead of a hearing on the prejudice question is only a
limited increase in the administrative burden of the courts. Much of the evidence used
to establish prejudice also goes to the merits. In cases where the defense fails, time will
be saved because duplication has been avoided. And where the defense prevails, only
part of the trial will have been unnecessary.
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When mandamus has been ineffective to preserve the right to speedy trial,
dismissal of the indictment may be an appropriate remedy It should be avail-
able to cure delays resulting from negligent or bona fide errors as well as from
wilfulness. But dismissal is not proper where a speedy trial '-as prevented
because of delays inherent in our judicial systen or traceable to the accused.
Even where it is available, the possibility of less drastic, alternative remedies
suggests that dismissal should rarely be granted merely because the accused
has suffered pre-conviction detriments in the nature of penal sanctions. Preju-
dice which materially affects the ability of the accused to defend himself is the
sole compelling reason for dismissal. However, a presumption that delay
results in prejudice is unwarranted. In each case courts should examine the
evidence on the question. Often it will be desirable to postpone a determin-
ation until the conclusion of trial.
Not every decrease in the ability of the accused to defend himself would seem to re-
quire dismissal. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); 1 AVIaG!oE, EVIDENCE § 21
(3d Ed. 1940). In many cases it may appear from other evidence that had the missing
testimony been available but erroneously excluded, the exclusion would have been harm-
less error under FE. R_ CRnI. P. 52(a). But where the accused wvas handicapped, unless
it appears that the verdict was not affected, the presumption of innocence should preail
to require dismissal.
Where the handicap claimed by the accused is material, its existence may be in issue.
In that case it seems reasonable to require the defendant to establish existence by the
greater probability. This is often the standard for affirmative defenses, Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952), and pleas in bar, United States v. Heike, 175 Fed. 852 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y.), writ of error dismissed, 217 U.S. 423 (1910), af'd, 192 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1911),
aff'd, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
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